GET /v1/me moves to GET /openapi/v1/account. DELETE
/v1/oauth/authorizations/self moves to DELETE
/openapi/v1/account/sessions/self. Both classes (AccountApi,
AccountSessionsSelfApi) are now in controllers/openapi/account.py and
re-registered on service_api_ns at the legacy paths.
service_api/oauth.py is now nothing but legacy re-mount declarations
(20 lines). All in-place handler logic has moved to openapi/. Phase F
will delete the file and the legacy mounts together.
Helper functions (_load_memberships, _pick_default_workspace,
_workspace_payload, _account_payload) move with the AccountApi class.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
Same pattern as B.6 / B.7: OAuthDeviceLookupApi moves to
controllers/openapi/oauth_device/lookup.py and is re-registered on
service_api_ns to keep /v1/oauth/device/lookup serving until Phase F.
service_api/oauth.py is now down to /me + /oauth/authorizations/self
plus three legacy mounts; remaining handlers move in Phase C.
Now-unused imports (LIMIT_LOOKUP_PUBLIC, rate_limit, reqparse, request,
DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS, DeviceFlowRedis, DeviceFlowStatus) removed.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
Same pattern as B.6: OAuthDeviceTokenApi moves to
controllers/openapi/oauth_device/token.py and is re-registered on
service_api_ns to keep /v1/oauth/device/token serving until Phase F.
_audit_cross_ip_if_needed helper moves with the handler. Now-unused
imports removed from service_api/oauth.py.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
Canonical class OAuthDeviceCodeApi now lives in
controllers/openapi/oauth_device/code.py and is registered on
openapi_ns at /openapi/v1/oauth/device/code. service_api/oauth.py
re-registers the same class object on service_api_ns at
/v1/oauth/device/code so existing callers keep working until Phase F.
KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS literal moves to dify_config.OPENAPI_KNOWN_CLIENT_IDS
(CSV-parsed, default "difyctl") so new CLIs / SDKs can be admitted
without code changes (CLAUDE.md rule 8 — no magic strings).
_verification_uri helper moves with the handler. Single source of
truth — no duplicated logic between the two mounts.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
OPENAPI_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS env var defaults to empty (same-origin only).
Operators expand for third-party integrations via comma-separated list.
Allowed headers: Authorization, Content-Type, X-CSRF-Token. Methods:
GET POST PATCH DELETE OPTIONS. Max-Age 600s. supports_credentials=True
so cookie-authed approve/deny work once Phase D moves them in.
Disallowed origins receive a normal 200 OPTIONS response without the
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header — flask-cors's standard behavior;
browser blocks the cross-origin request from the disallowed origin.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
Route-level scope gate; pairs with validate_bearer. Bearer holding the
catch-all SCOPE_FULL ('full', carried by dfoa_) passes any check;
narrower bearers (dfoe_, future PATs) need the exact scope listed in
the route decorator.
No v1.0 route applies it yet — apps/datasets controllers will be the
first consumers when those plans land. Programming-error guard: if
@require_scope runs without @validate_bearer above it, raises
RuntimeError instead of silently allowing.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
The decorator was defined inline in console/auth/oauth_device.py. Phase
D will move approve/deny to controllers/openapi/oauth_device/ and the
new SSO branch under the same group needs the same gate. Hoist it to
libs/oauth_bearer.py now so the move stays a pure file rename later.
Behavior unchanged: 503 'bearer_auth_disabled' when ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER
is off. console/auth/oauth_device.py imports it from libs and drops
the now-unused dify_config / wraps / ServiceUnavailable imports.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
Accepts.APP and the matching app- short-circuit existed to let routes
declare "I accept either OAuth or app- tokens", but no production
caller ever did, and the short-circuit returned without doing the
tenant/app/end-user setup that app- tokens actually need (that lives
in service_api/wraps.py:validate_app_token).
After this change, validate_bearer is OAuth-only. app- bearers fall
through the prefix dispatch and surface as InvalidBearer -> 401, which
is what we already promised on /openapi/* (no app- accepted) and what
the docstring claimed all along.
Pre-check rg "Accepts\\.APP" returned zero hits outside the function
being edited; no callers to update.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
New Flask blueprint at /openapi/v1/ that will host user-scoped
programmatic endpoints (device flow, identity, sessions, workspaces).
Ships only a smoke route GET /openapi/v1/_health for now; subsequent
phases lift handlers in from service_api, console, and the orphan
oauth_device_sso.py.
CORS is intentionally omitted here and configured in step A.5 once
the allowlist envvar lands.
Plan: docs/superpowers/plans/2026-04-26-openapi-migration.md (in difyctl repo).
- api: account-flow stores subject_issuer="dify:account" sentinel
instead of NULL so the rotate-in-place unique index collides as
intended (Postgres treats NULLs as distinct in unique indices).
mint_oauth_token validates prefix-specific issuer rules.
- api: enterprise_only inverts to an allowlist (ACTIVE / EXPIRING) so
any future LicenseStatus value defaults to denial.
- api: consume_on_poll moved to a single Lua script (GET + status-check
+ DEL) so concurrent pollers can't both observe APPROVED.
- web: typed DeviceFlowError + central error-copy mapping; page
surfaces rate_limited / lookup_failed view states; URL params
scrubbed after consumption (RFC 8628 §5.4).
Adds a CLI-friendly authorization flow so difyctl (and future
non-browser clients) can obtain user-scoped tokens without copy-
pasting cookies or raw API keys. Two grant paths share one device
flow surface:
1. Account branch — user signs in via the existing /signin
methods, /device page calls console-authed approve, mints a
dfoa_ token tied to (account_id, tenant).
2. External-SSO branch (EE) — /v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate signs
an SSOState envelope, hands off to Enterprise's external ACS,
receives a signed external-subject assertion, mints a dfoe_
token tied to (subject_email, subject_issuer).
API surface (all under /v1, EE-only endpoints 404 on CE):
POST /v1/oauth/device/code — RFC 8628 start
POST /v1/oauth/device/token — RFC 8628 poll
GET /v1/oauth/device/lookup — pre-validate user_code
GET /v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate — SSO branch entry
GET /v1/device/sso-complete — SSO callback sink
GET /v1/oauth/device/approval-context — /device cookie probe
POST /v1/oauth/device/approve-external — SSO approve
GET /v1/me — bearer subject lookup
DELETE /v1/oauth/authorizations/self — self-revoke
POST /console/api/oauth/device/approve — account approve
POST /console/api/oauth/device/deny — account deny
Core primitives:
- libs/oauth_bearer.py: prefix-keyed TokenKindRegistry +
BearerAuthenticator + validate_bearer decorator. Two-tier scope
(full vs apps:run) stamped from the registry, never from the DB.
- libs/jws.py: HS256 compact JWS keyed on the shared Dify
SECRET_KEY — same key-set verifies the SSOState envelope, the
external-subject assertion (minted by Enterprise), and the
approval-grant cookie.
- libs/device_flow_security.py: enterprise_only gate, approval-
grant cookie mint/verify/consume (Path=/v1/oauth/device,
HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure follows is_secure()), anti-
framing headers.
- libs/rate_limit.py: typed RateLimit / RateLimitScope dispatch
with composite-key buckets; both decorator + imperative form.
- services/oauth_device_flow.py: Redis state machine (PENDING ->
APPROVED|DENIED with atomic consume-on-poll), token mint via
partial unique index uq_oauth_active_per_device (rotates in
place), env-driven TTL policy.
Storage: oauth_access_tokens table with partial unique index on
(subject_email, subject_issuer, client_id, device_label) WHERE
revoked_at IS NULL. account_id NULL distinguishes external-SSO
rows. Hard-expire is CAS UPDATE (revoked_at + nullify token_hash)
so audit events keep their token_id. Retention pruner DELETEs
revoked + zombie-expired rows past OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_RETENTION_DAYS.
Frontend: /device page with code-entry, chooser (account vs SSO),
authorize-account, authorize-sso views. SSO branch detaches from
the URL user_code and reads everything from the cookie via
/approval-context. Anti-framing headers on all responses.
Wiring: ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER feature flag; ext_oauth_bearer binds
the authenticator at startup; clean_oauth_access_tokens_task
scheduled in ext_celery.
Spec: docs/specs/v1.0/server/{device-flow,tokens,middleware,security}.md
