Files
dify/api/libs/device_flow_security.py
GareArc 813da349ec fix(api,web): post-review hardening for OAuth device flow
- api: account-flow stores subject_issuer="dify:account" sentinel
  instead of NULL so the rotate-in-place unique index collides as
  intended (Postgres treats NULLs as distinct in unique indices).
  mint_oauth_token validates prefix-specific issuer rules.
- api: enterprise_only inverts to an allowlist (ACTIVE / EXPIRING) so
  any future LicenseStatus value defaults to denial.
- api: consume_on_poll moved to a single Lua script (GET + status-check
  + DEL) so concurrent pollers can't both observe APPROVED.
- web: typed DeviceFlowError + central error-copy mapping; page
  surfaces rate_limited / lookup_failed view states; URL params
  scrubbed after consumption (RFC 8628 §5.4).
2026-04-26 23:05:07 -07:00

190 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""Device-flow security primitives: enterprise_only gate, approval-grant
cookie mint/verify/consume, and anti-framing headers.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import secrets
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import UTC, datetime, timedelta
from functools import wraps
from typing import Callable
from flask import Blueprint
from werkzeug.exceptions import NotFound
from libs import jws
from libs.token import is_secure
from services.feature_service import FeatureService, LicenseStatus
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# ============================================================================
# enterprise_only decorator
# ============================================================================
# Fail-closed: any non-EE-active status (default NONE on CE, plus INACTIVE / EXPIRED / LOST)
# is denied. Future LicenseStatus values default to denial unless explicitly admitted.
_EE_ENABLED_STATUSES = {LicenseStatus.ACTIVE, LicenseStatus.EXPIRING}
def enterprise_only[**P, R](view: Callable[P, R]) -> Callable[P, R]:
"""404 on CE, passthrough on EE. Apply before rate-limit so CE
responses don't consume the bucket.
"""
@wraps(view)
def decorated(*args: P.args, **kwargs: P.kwargs):
settings = FeatureService.get_system_features()
if settings.license.status not in _EE_ENABLED_STATUSES:
raise NotFound()
return view(*args, **kwargs)
return decorated
# ============================================================================
# approval_grant cookie
# ============================================================================
APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME = "device_approval_grant"
APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_PATH = "/v1/oauth/device"
APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS = 300 # 5 min
NONCE_TTL_SECONDS = 600 # 2x cookie TTL — defeats clock-skew late replay
NONCE_KEY_FMT = "device_approval_grant_nonce:{nonce}"
SSO_ASSERTION_NONCE_KEY_FMT = "sso_assertion_nonce:{nonce}"
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class ApprovalGrantClaims:
subject_email: str
subject_issuer: str
user_code: str
nonce: str
csrf_token: str
expires_at: datetime
def mint_approval_grant(
*,
keyset: jws.KeySet,
iss: str,
subject_email: str,
subject_issuer: str,
user_code: str,
) -> tuple[str, ApprovalGrantClaims]:
"""Use ``approval_grant_cookie_kwargs`` to set the cookie — single
source of truth for Path/HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite.
"""
now = datetime.now(UTC)
exp = now + timedelta(seconds=APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS)
nonce = _random_opaque()
csrf_token = _random_opaque()
payload = {
"iss": iss,
"subject_email": subject_email,
"subject_issuer": subject_issuer,
"user_code": user_code,
"nonce": nonce,
"csrf_token": csrf_token,
}
token = jws.sign(keyset, payload, aud=jws.AUD_APPROVAL_GRANT, ttl_seconds=APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS)
return token, ApprovalGrantClaims(
subject_email=subject_email,
subject_issuer=subject_issuer,
user_code=user_code,
nonce=nonce,
csrf_token=csrf_token,
expires_at=exp,
)
def verify_approval_grant(keyset: jws.KeySet, token: str) -> ApprovalGrantClaims:
"""Sig + aud + exp only — nonce consumption is the caller's job."""
data = jws.verify(keyset, token, expected_aud=jws.AUD_APPROVAL_GRANT)
return ApprovalGrantClaims(
subject_email=data["subject_email"],
subject_issuer=data["subject_issuer"],
user_code=data["user_code"],
nonce=data["nonce"],
csrf_token=data["csrf_token"],
expires_at=datetime.fromtimestamp(data["exp"], tz=UTC),
)
def consume_approval_grant_nonce(redis_client, nonce: str) -> bool:
if not nonce:
return False
return bool(
redis_client.set(
NONCE_KEY_FMT.format(nonce=nonce), "1", nx=True, ex=NONCE_TTL_SECONDS,
)
)
def consume_sso_assertion_nonce(redis_client, nonce: str) -> bool:
if not nonce:
return False
return bool(
redis_client.set(
SSO_ASSERTION_NONCE_KEY_FMT.format(nonce=nonce), "1", nx=True, ex=NONCE_TTL_SECONDS,
)
)
def approval_grant_cookie_kwargs(value: str) -> dict:
"""``secure`` follows is_secure() so HTTP-only deployments don't
silently drop the cookie.
"""
return {
"key": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME,
"value": value,
"max_age": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_TTL_SECONDS,
"path": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_PATH,
"secure": is_secure(),
"httponly": True,
"samesite": "Lax",
}
def approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs() -> dict:
return {
"key": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME,
"value": "",
"max_age": 0,
"path": APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_PATH,
"secure": is_secure(),
"httponly": True,
"samesite": "Lax",
}
def _random_opaque() -> str:
return secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
# ============================================================================
# Anti-framing headers
# ============================================================================
_ANTI_FRAMING_HEADERS = {
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
"Content-Security-Policy": "frame-ancestors 'none'",
}
def attach_anti_framing(bp: Blueprint) -> None:
"""X-Frame-Options + CSP on every response from ``bp`` (CI invariant #4)."""
@bp.after_request
def _apply_headers(response):
for name, value in _ANTI_FRAMING_HEADERS.items():
response.headers.setdefault(name, value)
return response