Files
dify/api/controllers/oauth_device_sso.py
GareArc fe8510ad1a feat(api,web): OAuth 2.0 device flow + bearer auth (RFC 8628)
Adds a CLI-friendly authorization flow so difyctl (and future
non-browser clients) can obtain user-scoped tokens without copy-
pasting cookies or raw API keys. Two grant paths share one device
flow surface:

  1. Account branch — user signs in via the existing /signin
     methods, /device page calls console-authed approve, mints a
     dfoa_ token tied to (account_id, tenant).
  2. External-SSO branch (EE) — /v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate signs
     an SSOState envelope, hands off to Enterprise's external ACS,
     receives a signed external-subject assertion, mints a dfoe_
     token tied to (subject_email, subject_issuer).

API surface (all under /v1, EE-only endpoints 404 on CE):

  POST   /v1/oauth/device/code              — RFC 8628 start
  POST   /v1/oauth/device/token             — RFC 8628 poll
  GET    /v1/oauth/device/lookup            — pre-validate user_code
  GET    /v1/oauth/device/sso-initiate      — SSO branch entry
  GET    /v1/device/sso-complete            — SSO callback sink
  GET    /v1/oauth/device/approval-context  — /device cookie probe
  POST   /v1/oauth/device/approve-external  — SSO approve
  GET    /v1/me                             — bearer subject lookup
  DELETE /v1/oauth/authorizations/self      — self-revoke
  POST   /console/api/oauth/device/approve  — account approve
  POST   /console/api/oauth/device/deny     — account deny

Core primitives:
- libs/oauth_bearer.py: prefix-keyed TokenKindRegistry +
  BearerAuthenticator + validate_bearer decorator. Two-tier scope
  (full vs apps:run) stamped from the registry, never from the DB.
- libs/jws.py: HS256 compact JWS keyed on the shared Dify
  SECRET_KEY — same key-set verifies the SSOState envelope, the
  external-subject assertion (minted by Enterprise), and the
  approval-grant cookie.
- libs/device_flow_security.py: enterprise_only gate, approval-
  grant cookie mint/verify/consume (Path=/v1/oauth/device,
  HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure follows is_secure()), anti-
  framing headers.
- libs/rate_limit.py: typed RateLimit / RateLimitScope dispatch
  with composite-key buckets; both decorator + imperative form.
- services/oauth_device_flow.py: Redis state machine (PENDING ->
  APPROVED|DENIED with atomic consume-on-poll), token mint via
  partial unique index uq_oauth_active_per_device (rotates in
  place), env-driven TTL policy.

Storage: oauth_access_tokens table with partial unique index on
(subject_email, subject_issuer, client_id, device_label) WHERE
revoked_at IS NULL. account_id NULL distinguishes external-SSO
rows. Hard-expire is CAS UPDATE (revoked_at + nullify token_hash)
so audit events keep their token_id. Retention pruner DELETEs
revoked + zombie-expired rows past OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_RETENTION_DAYS.

Frontend: /device page with code-entry, chooser (account vs SSO),
authorize-account, authorize-sso views. SSO branch detaches from
the URL user_code and reads everything from the cookie via
/approval-context. Anti-framing headers on all responses.

Wiring: ENABLE_OAUTH_BEARER feature flag; ext_oauth_bearer binds
the authenticator at startup; clean_oauth_access_tokens_task
scheduled in ext_celery.

Spec: docs/specs/v1.0/server/{device-flow,tokens,middleware,security}.md
2026-04-26 20:06:43 -07:00

265 lines
9.3 KiB
Python

"""SSO-branch device-flow endpoints. Browser hits sso-initiate → API
signs an SSOState envelope → Enterprise inner-API returns IdP authorize
URL → 302. IdP → Enterprise ACS → DeviceFlowDispatcher mints a signed
external-subject assertion → 302 to /v1/device/sso-complete → API mints
the approval-grant cookie → /device → user clicks Approve → /approve-
external mints the OAuth token. All four endpoints are EE-only.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import secrets
from extensions.ext_database import db
from extensions.ext_redis import redis_client
from flask import Blueprint, jsonify, make_response, redirect, request
from libs import jws
from libs.oauth_bearer import SubjectType
from libs.rate_limit import (
LIMIT_APPROVE_EXT_PER_EMAIL,
LIMIT_SSO_INITIATE_PER_IP,
enforce,
rate_limit,
)
from libs.device_flow_security import (APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME, ApprovalGrantClaims,
approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs,
approval_grant_cookie_kwargs,
attach_anti_framing,
consume_approval_grant_nonce,
consume_sso_assertion_nonce,
enterprise_only, mint_approval_grant,
verify_approval_grant)
from services.enterprise.enterprise_service import EnterpriseService
from services.oauth_device_flow import (PREFIX_OAUTH_EXTERNAL_SSO,
DeviceFlowRedis, DeviceFlowStatus,
InvalidTransition, StateNotFound,
mint_oauth_token, oauth_ttl_days)
from werkzeug.exceptions import (BadGateway, BadRequest, Conflict, Forbidden,
NotFound, Unauthorized)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
bp = Blueprint("oauth_device_sso", __name__, url_prefix="/v1")
attach_anti_framing(bp)
# Matches DEVICE_FLOW_TTL_SECONDS so the signed state can't outlive the
# device_code it references.
STATE_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
@bp.route("/oauth/device/sso-initiate", methods=["GET"])
@enterprise_only
@rate_limit(LIMIT_SSO_INITIATE_PER_IP)
def sso_initiate():
user_code = (request.args.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
if not user_code:
raise BadRequest("user_code required")
store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
if found is None:
raise BadRequest("invalid_user_code")
_, state = found
if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
raise BadRequest("invalid_user_code")
keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
signed_state = jws.sign(
keyset,
payload={
"redirect_url": "",
"app_code": "",
"intent": "device_flow",
"user_code": user_code,
"nonce": secrets.token_urlsafe(16),
"return_to": "",
"idp_callback_url": f"{request.host_url.rstrip('/')}/v1/device/sso-complete",
},
aud=jws.AUD_STATE_ENVELOPE,
ttl_seconds=STATE_ENVELOPE_TTL_SECONDS,
)
try:
reply = EnterpriseService.initiate_device_flow_sso(signed_state)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("sso-initiate: enterprise call failed: %s", e)
raise BadGateway("sso_initiate_failed") from e
url = (reply or {}).get("url")
if not url:
raise BadGateway("sso_initiate_missing_url")
# Clear stale approval-grant — defends against cross-tab/back-button mixing.
resp = redirect(url, code=302)
resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs())
return resp
@bp.route("/device/sso-complete", methods=["GET"])
@enterprise_only
def sso_complete():
blob = request.args.get("sso_assertion")
if not blob:
raise BadRequest("sso_assertion required")
keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
try:
claims = jws.verify(keyset, blob, expected_aud=jws.AUD_EXT_SUBJECT_ASSERTION)
except jws.VerifyError as e:
logger.warning("sso-complete: rejected assertion: %s", e)
raise BadRequest("invalid_sso_assertion") from e
if not consume_sso_assertion_nonce(redis_client, claims.get("nonce", "")):
raise BadRequest("invalid_sso_assertion")
user_code = (claims.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
found = store.load_by_user_code(user_code)
if found is None:
raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
_, state = found
if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
iss = request.host_url.rstrip("/")
cookie_value, _ = mint_approval_grant(
keyset=keyset,
iss=iss,
subject_email=claims["email"],
subject_issuer=claims["issuer"],
user_code=user_code,
)
resp = redirect("/device?sso_verified=1", code=302)
resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cookie_kwargs(cookie_value))
return resp
@bp.route("/oauth/device/approval-context", methods=["GET"])
@enterprise_only
def approval_context():
token = request.cookies.get(APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME)
if not token:
raise Unauthorized("no_session")
keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
try:
claims = verify_approval_grant(keyset, token)
except jws.VerifyError as e:
logger.warning("approval-context: bad cookie: %s", e)
raise Unauthorized("no_session") from e
return jsonify({
"subject_email": claims.subject_email,
"subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
"user_code": claims.user_code,
"csrf_token": claims.csrf_token,
"expires_at": claims.expires_at.isoformat(),
}), 200
@bp.route("/oauth/device/approve-external", methods=["POST"])
@enterprise_only
def approve_external():
token = request.cookies.get(APPROVAL_GRANT_COOKIE_NAME)
if not token:
raise Unauthorized("invalid_session")
keyset = jws.KeySet.from_shared_secret()
try:
claims: ApprovalGrantClaims = verify_approval_grant(keyset, token)
except jws.VerifyError as e:
logger.warning("approve-external: bad cookie: %s", e)
raise Unauthorized("invalid_session") from e
enforce(LIMIT_APPROVE_EXT_PER_EMAIL, key=f"subject:{claims.subject_email}")
csrf_header = request.headers.get("X-CSRF-Token", "")
if not csrf_header or csrf_header != claims.csrf_token:
raise Forbidden("csrf_mismatch")
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
body_user_code = (data.get("user_code") or "").strip().upper()
if body_user_code != claims.user_code:
raise BadRequest("user_code_mismatch")
store = DeviceFlowRedis(redis_client)
found = store.load_by_user_code(claims.user_code)
if found is None:
raise NotFound("user_code_not_pending")
device_code, state = found
if state.status is not DeviceFlowStatus.PENDING:
raise Conflict("user_code_not_pending")
if not consume_approval_grant_nonce(redis_client, claims.nonce):
raise Unauthorized("session_already_consumed")
ttl_days = oauth_ttl_days(tenant_id=None)
mint = mint_oauth_token(
db.session,
redis_client,
subject_email=claims.subject_email,
subject_issuer=claims.subject_issuer,
account_id=None,
client_id=state.client_id,
device_label=state.device_label,
prefix=PREFIX_OAUTH_EXTERNAL_SSO,
ttl_days=ttl_days,
)
poll_payload = {
"token": mint.token,
"expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
"subject_type": SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
"subject_email": claims.subject_email,
"subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
"account": None,
"workspaces": [],
"default_workspace_id": None,
"token_id": str(mint.token_id),
}
try:
store.approve(
device_code,
subject_email=claims.subject_email,
account_id=None,
subject_issuer=claims.subject_issuer,
minted_token=mint.token,
token_id=str(mint.token_id),
poll_payload=poll_payload,
)
except (StateNotFound, InvalidTransition) as e:
logger.error("approve-external: state transition raced: %s", e)
raise Conflict("state_lost") from e
_emit_approve_external_audit(state, claims, mint)
resp = make_response(jsonify({"status": "approved"}), 200)
resp.set_cookie(**approval_grant_cleared_cookie_kwargs())
return resp
def _emit_approve_external_audit(state, claims, mint) -> None:
logger.warning(
"audit: oauth.device_flow_approved subject_type=%s "
"subject_email=%s subject_issuer=%s token_id=%s",
SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO, claims.subject_email, claims.subject_issuer, mint.token_id,
extra={
"audit": True,
"event": "oauth.device_flow_approved",
"subject_type": SubjectType.EXTERNAL_SSO,
"subject_email": claims.subject_email,
"subject_issuer": claims.subject_issuer,
"token_id": str(mint.token_id),
"client_id": state.client_id,
"device_label": state.device_label,
"scopes": ["apps:run"],
"expires_at": mint.expires_at.isoformat(),
},
)