## Summary
Two bypass vectors in the sandbox code security analyzer allowed
malicious code to pass the safety check undetected and reach the Docker
executor.
### 1. JavaScript: template-literal bypass of `require()` block
The `SecureJavaScriptAnalyzer` regex patterns used `['"]` to match
module names, covering only single and double quotes. An attacker could
use ES6 template literals to bypass all three `require` checks:
`javascript
const cp = require(`child_process`);
async function main() {
return cp.execSync('cat /etc/passwd').toString();
}
`
The same bypass applied to `fs` and `worker_threads`.
**Fix:** Updated all three `require` patterns from `['"]` to `['"\]` to
also match backtick template literals.
### 2. Python: `builtins` not blocked + attribute-call blind spot in
`visit_Call`
`visit_Call` only checked `ast.Name` nodes, so attribute-style calls
like `module.func()` were invisible to the analyzer. Additionally,
`builtins` was absent from `DANGEROUS_IMPORTS`. Combined, this allowed:
`python
import builtins
def main():
builtins.exec('import os; os.system("id")')
`
Neither the import nor the exec call triggered any flag.
**Fix:** Added `builtins` to `DANGEROUS_IMPORTS` and added an
`ast.Attribute` branch to `visit_Call` so that `module.dangerous_func()`
style calls are caught alongside bare `dangerous_func()` calls.
## Tests
Added four regression tests covering each new bypass vector:
- `test_javascript_child_process_template_literal_is_rejected`
- `test_javascript_fs_template_literal_is_rejected`
- `test_python_builtins_import_is_rejected`
- `test_python_attribute_eval_call_is_rejected`
---------
Co-authored-by: bounty-hunter <bounty@hunter.local>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Resolves#14447. *(Note: This supersedes stalled PR #14448 and
implements the requested CodeRabbitAI fixes).*
Currently, the Dockerfiles inside `agent/sandbox/sandbox_base_image`
(both Python and Node.js) have hardcoded Chinese package mirrors. This
forces the mirrors on all users globally, which causes build network
timeouts for contributors outside of China.
This PR introduces an enhancement to fix the issue by:
1. Implementing the `NEED_MIRROR` build argument in the sandbox
Dockerfiles.
2. Replacing static `ENV` instructions with conditional shell logic
inside `RUN` blocks to dynamically set the package registries.
3. Allowing the build to cleanly fall back to default global registries
(`pypi.org` and `npmjs.org`) when `--build-arg NEED_MIRROR=0` is passed.
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
- [x] Refactoring
---------
Co-authored-by: Jin Hai <haijin.chn@gmail.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
Sandbox cannot accept large args list.
### Type of change
- [x] Bug Fix (non-breaking change which fixes an issue)
