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## Summary
Two bypass vectors in the sandbox code security analyzer allowed
malicious code to pass the safety check undetected and reach the Docker
executor.
### 1. JavaScript: template-literal bypass of `require()` block
The `SecureJavaScriptAnalyzer` regex patterns used `['"]` to match
module names, covering only single and double quotes. An attacker could
use ES6 template literals to bypass all three `require` checks:
`javascript
const cp = require(`child_process`);
async function main() {
return cp.execSync('cat /etc/passwd').toString();
}
`
The same bypass applied to `fs` and `worker_threads`.
**Fix:** Updated all three `require` patterns from `['"]` to `['"\]` to
also match backtick template literals.
### 2. Python: `builtins` not blocked + attribute-call blind spot in
`visit_Call`
`visit_Call` only checked `ast.Name` nodes, so attribute-style calls
like `module.func()` were invisible to the analyzer. Additionally,
`builtins` was absent from `DANGEROUS_IMPORTS`. Combined, this allowed:
`python
import builtins
def main():
builtins.exec('import os; os.system("id")')
`
Neither the import nor the exec call triggered any flag.
**Fix:** Added `builtins` to `DANGEROUS_IMPORTS` and added an
`ast.Attribute` branch to `visit_Call` so that `module.dangerous_func()`
style calls are caught alongside bare `dangerous_func()` calls.
## Tests
Added four regression tests covering each new bypass vector:
- `test_javascript_child_process_template_literal_is_rejected`
- `test_javascript_fs_template_literal_is_rejected`
- `test_python_builtins_import_is_rejected`
- `test_python_attribute_eval_call_is_rejected`
---------
Co-authored-by: bounty-hunter <bounty@hunter.local>